Control System Cyber Security: 
Staying Ahead of the Evolving Threats
Executive
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Industrials Controllers are an integral part of heavy industry and manufacturing across the globe. There's nothing remarkable about this statement, as the migration to computer control of processes and systems has been decades in the making. However, what is significant is that during the past decade, the number of systems being exposed to the Internet has grown tremendously. Remote software upgrades, remote system monitoring, and ease of access and the commensurate efficiencies and cost reduction are all real benefits reaped by Internet access.
However, as Industrial Control Systems were originally designed for use in a physically secure environment, isolated from the outside world, their software was typically not designed to detect and/or prevent malicious intent. Targeted attacks on Industrial Systems and Public Utilities have now become a very real threat, with break-ins and cyber-physical assaults making headlines. Even systems disconnected from the Internet have been successfully targeted through infected, shared documents and contaminated flash memory drives. Highly valuable systems in the oil and gas industry are equally vulnerable. Fortunately, with judicious application of good security practices, Drillships, FPSO's, and Semisubmersibles can be cost-effectively secured from insider and outside security threats.
Background
A diver support vessel's control system suddenly loses position control and begins to drift while the divers below are put in harm's way. A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) on the vessel's Dynamic Positioning system had entered an error state and flooded the primary and backup control networks with erroneous data, knocking all connected systems offline. Before control is restored the vessel is a 200 meters from its station and one diver has been left unconscious on the template bail out and the other stranded in the diving bell. The unconscious diver is rescued by his companion from the diving bell once the vessel arrives back on station. Is this a scene from a movie? Unfortunately not, it was a recent, real-world failure documented in an IMCA Safety Flash. Just as unsettling is that the root cause of the network jamming was never identified. While Viruses, Trojans, worms, and backdoors have been generally associated with web-servers, PCs, and phones having access to the Internet, serious concerns about cyber-physical attacks on industrial control systems have also been raised-attacks which could result in conditions similar to the loss of positional control just described.
Problem
With more and more industrial control systems exposed to external, uncontrolled access for remote upgrades, remote monitoring, and ease of access, these systems are often visible to hackers as well. Combine this access with the increased use of highly targeted and often outdated or unpatched operating systems, and there is good reason for concern. Layered on this is the fact that many SCADA systems may use default user names and passwords for administrative access, making SCADA and industrial controls systems vulnerable. Sometimes, passwords are not even required. This problem is so prevalent that online search engines have been developed to specifically identify control systems with known gaps. As another example, it was recently reported that a popular software tool used to manage SCADA and PLC control systems, including ones used in vessel navigation, contained back-door functionality that allowed hackers to remotely issue powerful system-level commands.
Drilling rig control networks are often well-isolated from the outside world, with software and hardware controls providing a buffer between the rig and external support networks that may be exposed to potential hacker access. Combining these countermeasures with the actual, physical isolation of the drilling rig when in deep-water operation would surely provide a measure of physical security not found in typical industrial control applications, right? Unfortunately, as demonstrated by recent attacks using very sophisticated, targeted programs, it appears that there are still many ways to compromise an isolated control system.
The Stuxnet worm, was nation-state developed malicious code designed to target a specific application and it's hardware, namely Iranian-based Uranium enrichment centrifuges. It was aimed explicitly at Windows-based machines running Siemens STEP7 software, controlling Siemens 315 PLCs. Key to the execution of this attack was the passing of the original worm through the use of infected flash drives inserted into the targeted systems' USB connector by equipment operators. The worm spread through the otherwise isolated control network, and was used to systematically destroy the centrifuges by driving them outside of their design limits.
Offshore assets with complex operational capabilities like FPSO's, Drillships and Semisubmersibles, while not necessarily targets for national security-based malicious attacks, are nevertheless, high-value targets whose compromise may have high-consequence results. Control systems on-board the vessel, such as the Dynamic Positioning (DP) System, require real-time operation, interference of which may result in destructive, expensive, and even life-threatening situations.
Solution
With the current threat landscape, with even isolated control networks at risk, here are six, high-payoff steps or practices which should be implemented, even before a security baseline and gap assessment has been performed.
1.
Network Design and Implementation Perform a survey of the control network to ensure there are no undocumented bridges or devices that have been attached. Are all ports accounted for and secure?
2.
Host Configuration Validate proper user and password control on each system. Does the administrator have a low-level account to use for standard workstation operation? Validate that all unused ports and services are turned off.
3.
Virus and Malware Protection Ensure virus and malware scanners are installed and properly configured to detect new and updated files, yet not interfere with real-time operation.
4.
USB Access Insertion of USB flash drives is a common avenue for spread of malicious software. Ensure there is not a means for unauthorized physical access to the USB ports on each system. If this is not possible, ensure USB ports been disabled by operating system configuration.
5.
Extraneous Program Removal Adobe Acrobat, while seemingly a common and benign standard program, have been the avenue for many recent attacks. Ensure all unneeded programs have been removed from the system.
6.
Recovery Plan Develop a detailed recovery plan for the network and each device attached. Test the recovery plan, from simulated fault through complete recovery at least once a year.
Diving Deeper
Industry recognized security practices reduce risk and ensure high-consequence situations are unlikely to happen. For a complex Drillship, however, blindly applying industry IT standards is not only over-kill, but could result in degraded performance of a system. Imagine an uncoordinated virus scan of a workstation's hard-drive capturing enough of the systems' bandwidth to undermine deterministic, real-time control. Therefore, application of purpose-built security assessments are required, providing a detailed review of the rig's control system networks, their topology, devices, and system/software maintenance plan from a control-system perspective. This balanced assessment provides the operator with greater assurance that the rig's control systems are reliable and secure, and the threat of a cyber-physical attack is mitigated, while ensuring control system specifications continue to be met.
A Baseline System Security Image, Threats Assessment, Gaps Review, and Risk Assessment is performed where the entire system is "scored" from a security perspective. Security policies, patch management plans, enabled ports and services, account management, security layer adequacy, and recovery planning (including recovery testing) reviews are carried out and compared to industry standards and best practices. These results are compared to historical records and against other assets. Any serious gaps are noted, prioritized, and monitored for remediation. Recurrent security scoring is done to ensure controlled security changes, responsive to the evolving threats as well as updates/upgrades to the vessel's control systems, are implemented as needed. A complete picture of the overall process is shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Overall Control System Security Review and Remediation
The fundamental basis for understanding the "as-is" status of the system is development of the Baseline System Security Image. The image consists of three key parts: the Security Policy Review, the Network and Device Survey, and the Recovery Plan and Test Review, as shown in Figure 2 .
While these elements will be described in more detail in the following sections, a high-level overview is provided here.
As shown, a key, initial component of the Baseline System Security Image for the control system is to review the written, or possibly unwritten security policy in place. A more formal organization will have the policy as a document as part of the rest of the document stores. Other organizations have an unwritten defacto policy that is applied and owned, or co-owned by the various control system administrators. Data is collected on the system and policies through the documentation available, including design specifications and operator's manuals. If needed, an interview of the control system administrator(s) is used to fill in any knowledge gaps on the actual security policy. The data collection and potential interview may be part of the pre-commissioning or commissioning process. Important elements to understand when this step is complete include: security layers in place, along with their management, account policies and management, access control, and software and patch management.
A solid understanding of the network and the devices (workstations and controllers) connected to it is fundamental in determining the various avenues for insider and outsider attacks. Full documentation of the as-designed system as well as a physical survey of un-documented networks and devices provide a means to understand the baseline hardware and software state. On the network level, ProfiBus/Modbus/Fieldbus, wireless, control network(s) and physical connections and setup are verified. Each device (including PLCs, SBCs, servers, and operator stations) is reviewed for port and service access, along with anti-virus/malware, installed software necessity, operating system and software patch application, and account and privilege configuration.
Finally, system and device recovery plans are reviewed for adequacy and completeness. Recovery plans must have clear ownership delineated and must provide automated software and configuration backups. It is important to test as much of the recovery plan as possible, from simulation of a failure to complete recovery via the backup system. The simulated failure must exercise all backup systems, including sustained Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) function, potential common-mode failures, and restoration of all critical system parameters, to name a few items.
Figure 2: Baseline System Security Image
Baseline Process Details Security Policy Review The vessel's Control System Security Policy, whether as a document or instituted by practice, defines the process and rules the staff must follow when using equipment, devices, and software that are part of the vessel's control systems. The Policy, should address: As an example, Account Management sets the high-level policy on which operators are able to obtain a given level of access to which equipment and under which specific circumstances. The "principle of least privilege required," along with access to minimal functionality to perform the job is used to help prevent accidental faults while discouraging insider misuse. As a further security protection, control system owners are encouraged to set up operator accounts to prevent accidental deletion or reconfiguration of critical files. Review of these policies and practices is reflected in an overall security score assigned during the baseline evaluation.
Whether part of the Security Policy or a separate document, recovery planning and recovering testing policy is reviewed to determine the overall strategy ensuring the vessel's critical systems will be able to continue operation with minimal disruption in the event of an unforeseen event.
As the various layers of security determine the threat's ability to attack the Industrial Control System, one of the end results of the Policy Review is to get a high-level picture of the layers of security in place to thwart such threats, as shown in Figure 3 .
Figure 3: Layers of Security
Recovery Plan and Recovery Test Plan Many Industrial Control Systems on a Drillship are critical to its operation, including, but not limited to the Dynamic Positioning System, Drilling Control System, Power Control System, Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System. Fortunately, for such vessels, double and triple-redundancy of such critical systems is required, however, when a system does fail, the vessel is temporarily reliant on a backup system whose further loss would render the vessel inoperable on some level. Therefore, it is imperative that the failed system be brought back online as quickly and safely as possible. In the unforeseen event that a common-mode failure does somehow occur, as in the example diving support vessel used as an example early in this white paper, the ability to recover from a failure while under duress is even more critical.
Therefore, not only should detailed recovery plans be in place, but these plans should readily available in printed form and must be tested at least annually with a simulated system fault, subsequent failure, and recovery operation as provided explicitly in the plan. The recovery plan must provide step-by-step procedures, including validation of any and all process parameters to ensure no disruptions or discontinuities occur when the restarted system comes back online. While it may not be possible for the recovery test to be performed during the baseline review, plans must be in place to perform a complete test on a regular basis.
Network and Device Survey
After the overall Security Policy is understood, it is necessary to examine the actual network and devices to ensure compliance with the Security Policy and to review against published security standards and best practices.
The overall network topology is analyzed and compared to documented network design specifications. Proper use and configuration of firewalls and demilitarized zones, as well as wireless networks is reviewed. Use of static IP addresses and disablement of dynamic IP assignment for routers, devices, and servers on the control system network is validated.
A baseline audit of individual workstations is performed to ensure that the administrative and user password security policies (including privileges) have been adhered to, and the minimal functionality of software is in place for the workstation, controller, or other device to perform its intended use. Ports and services are audited to ensure that only those required for the workstation or controller to function as intended are enabled. The audit will include the availability of and restrictions on use of removable media, including flash memory. Depending on stated policy, the presence and configuration of anti-virus and anti-malware scanners are confirmed, along with comprehensiveness of patches and revisions updates as compared to those currently available for the operating system and installed software. Existence and completeness of system recovery procedures are reviewed, along with the device's ability to log and/or print system events (including security events). Where the control network provides for it, internal static IP addresses and ports tables which identify trusted devices on the network are validated for completeness. Finally, BIOS boot settings and configuration passwords are reviewed, along with the use of any shared accounts for the system.
Threats Assessment
Threats to the security of a control system change on a regular basis, sometimes weekly. It is not uncommon for anti-virus definitions to change on a monthly or weekly basis, in the same way, new approaches to attacks are being constantly invented. In this regard, it is important to have an understanding of the current threats identified before proceeding into the next phase of identifying gaps in control system security. Current threats are identified through publications from anti-virus vendors, operating system vendors, database system providers, software vendors, CERT, US-CERT, to name a few.
Gaps Review
After a complete baseline system image has been developed, it is important to compare these findings not only to the documented and narrated Secure Policy of record for the vessel, but compare it to best-known practices, standards, and guidelines, as well as identify areas that are new avenues for recently identified security threats. It is critical for an expert within the particular domain to be made available to the reviewer to provide guidance in applying standards and guidelines judiciously. For example, it is well-known that many virus scanners in their standard configuration will often take significant processor and hard-drive bandwidth during a complete scan, and could interfere with real-time operation. Often these hard drive scans are scheduled for "after-hours," for typical business systems, however, for a Drillship, there is often never an "after-hours" condition. Under these circumstances, it is important to configure the scanners, after a baseline system scan has been performed, to only scan changes to the system, such as when a flash memory drive may be attached, if so enabled.
Risk Assessment
After the gaps in security have been identified, the risks to the system can be assessed. In order to adequately assess the risks, various modes of potential security breaches along with the potential consequences must be established. Table 1 shows a small subset of representative threats that should be addressed as part of a comprehensive review.
Each threat, based on, in part, the Threats Assessment and knowledge of the vessels' network topology as well as identification attack models. For example, according to recent studies by CERT, almost 50 percent of all companies have been hit by insider attacks. Consequently, this potential threat must be addressed when performing the risk assessment.
Prioritization and Remediation Plan
The likelihood of a particular threat and associated attack method along with the potential degree of damage potential provides a basis for the expected cost of a given security gap, if not secured. Depending on the remediation options and relative costs, a prioritization and remediation plan is developed. The details of this plan include determining if a threat is severe enough to disrupt current operations, such as in the case of the software patch issued for the diving support vessel DP loss of control, or whether the update, upgrade, installation, or reconfiguration may be coordinated with an existing scheduled maintenance activity. Table 1 shows a portion of a Prioritization Table, before remediation cost and final prioritization have been factored in.
Figure 3: Threats and Remediation

Implementation
The implementation of the remediation plan must be approached as any other well-run project on the vessel. Development of set of overall requirements, work breakdown structure with owner and responsibility assignments, and detailed schedule ensure implementation proceeds efficiently, with minimal disruption to the operation of any affected system on the vessel. Each control system on the ship has been designed and installed by an OEM who effectively owns the support and maintenance of the system. In this regard, any concerns which have been identified must be vetted with, and ideally, implemented by the OEM. However, administrative changes, such as user accounts, passwords, and privileges are readily handled by the electrical technician or other owner of the control system which has gaps identified. Likewise, as an example, physical lockout of USB ports via after-market locks can be coordinated by owners on the vessel, if so required.
Update System Image
After the implementation stage, the original system security image is updated with any changes along with the associated security scorecard. This update provides the control system owners with a basis for determining the viability of the just-completed review and correction process and becomes the new baseline when the cycle is repeated. Unfortunately, unlike many purely physical security systems, control system security is an ever-moving target where new adversaries and threats are continually being developed. Therefore, Security Audits providing updated System Images and Security Scores must be performed on a regular basis to stay ahead of the threats and new vulnerabilities. Likewise, over the course of time, computers and controller hardware is upgraded and/or replaced, software is patched and upgraded patched, and personnel, their accounts, and user responsibilities change. While an annual security audit may have been sufficient for the conditions a decade ago, the growing number threats along with their ability to inflict damage on critical control systems on high-value, high-consequence platforms, as well as the rapidity of technology advances and system changes, call for increased audit frequency. Updates performed every six months, and with every change in Drillship, FPSO, or Semi-Submersible ownership are advised. This update period strikes a balance between the rapidity of the development of new threats and potential disruption to daily vessel activity. However, depending on the results of the initial and subsequent audit scores as well as increase or decrease in future threat activity, the time between updates period should be shortened or lengthened.
Conclusion
The benefits of modern Industrial Control Systems have never been greater. High speed control of large, complex systems, enabled by diverse and accurate sensors and actuators allow operations to be performed never dreamt of a few decades ago. However, while these systems have evolved, the threats to their safe and secure operation have grown. Whether the threat is from an unanticipated and inadvertent miscue from an operator, a disgruntled insider, or a malicious outside antagonist, the consequences of a system controller being affected and then performing in an unpredictable or unstable manner are never good. Best case scenarios result in a redundant system detecting a fault and pulling the errant controller offline, while the cause of the failure is determined. Worst case scenarios, as bad as some latest examples have been, involve complete loss of control, damage to systems, and loss of life.
Therefore, while the return on investment for a complete control system security audit may be difficult to calculate, the cost of not having a complete plan in place may, if a worst-case condition arises, be impossible to comprehend. A Baseline Security System Image, as a start, allows a vessel owner or operator to understand the security risks with a standardized security score and implications of the existing gaps, if any. Resultant security gaps, identified by comparing the baseline with the threats landscape, followed by an analysis of the potential damage from an attack, allows the owner to best determine which, if any corrective actions need to be taken.
For More Information:
Cris DeWitt 
